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ADVERSARY INFERENCES
THE HONORABLE FRANK H. EASTERBROOK"
Are there problems with lawyers in the adversary system?
People tend to blame lawyers when things go wrong, and,
although there are many definitions of what it means for things
to "go wrong" (excess expense, needless delay, and incorrect
outcomes are three common manifestations), there is a
consensus that lawyers are at the heart of the problem. I think
that this way of putting things is misleading and the common
conclusion flawed. Let me explain why.
People respond to the rules they face. Over the long run they
are helpful or manipulative or truthful or deceitful or
uninformed because it pays to be so. Some lawyers are saints or
sinners all the time; they do not respond strongly to rules. But
for most people, most of the time, incentives matter. Let us
concentrate on these people. To understand how lawyers as a
group behave, and whether these behaviors are good or bad, we
must look at the system of rules that govern litigation and not
just at the lawyers.
An adversarial system is a system of party control rather than a
system of court control, which lawyers call inquisitorial. But the
difference between adversarial tribunals in the United States
and inquisitorial tribunals in Europe is deeper than the
question whether lawyers or judges take the lead in eliciting
facts. In the United States, professionals make arguments to
amateurs. Jurors are amateurs in almost all respects, often
celebrated on that account, and even the judge, usually
knowledgeable about law, is an amateur on many scientific and
technical questions that come up in the course of litigation.
That professionals argue to amateurs has profound
consequences for the way the adversary system works. Two
sophisticated attorneys furnish evidence and argue inferences to
a decisionmaker. But when the decisionmaker is not as
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The
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sophisticated as the persons presenting the evidence, what
happens? I invite you to step back from the two-party case in
court and ask you how well the process of drawing inferences
works in one-party cases: somebody tries to sell you something,
say, a car or a share of stock.'
Any model of automobile has strong and weak points. A small
car may get 35 miles to the gallon, but in an accident it behaves
like an accordion, with the occupants in the middle. Think of
the many other variables. There are differences among cars in
the quality of ride, in the stopping distance, in whether the car
includes four-wheel drive and other safety features, in whether
everything works as planned, in repair rates and costs, and so
on.
Assume for now that sellers always tell the truth, that rules
against fraud in the marketplace and perjury in court are fully
enforced. Still, to tell "nothing but the truth" is not to tell "the
whole truth"; lawyers and salesmen are selective. What
information does the seller furnish to the customer in order to
make a sale? That depends on who is listening. Suppose the
listener is naive. Then the seller stresses the good points. He
might say: "This car gets at least 35 miles to the gallon" and keep
silent about the bad points such as poor crashworthiness. A
credulous customer assumes that, when the salesman says this
car gets at least 35 miles to the gallon, that the salesman means,
say, 40 miles to the gallon and that the car is crashworthy. Some
truth is told, and no lies, but bad inferences are drawn.
Now suppose the buyer is sophisticated. A sophisticated buyer
knows what attributes matter, and what the distribution of these
attributes is among cars in general (although not necessarily
which model has which attributes). The sophisticated buyer puts
this knowledge to work through skepticism. A skeptical buyer
reasons:
Aha The seller told me the car gets at least 35 miles to the
gallon. Thus I know that it gets exactly 35 miles to the gallon,
1. There is a substantial economic literature on questions such as this, to which I
allude in this brief essay without developing the details. My own academic work has
concentrated on the sale of financial instruments. A discussion of the process of
disclosure and inference-drawing appears in FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 276-303 (1991). The approach
to disclosure used in that book, and in this essay, has its genesis in Sanford F. Grossman,
The Informational Rol of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 461 (1981).
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because if it got 36 miles to the gallon, the seller would have
said so. It doesn't cost the seller extra to say that a model that
gets 36 miles to the gallon does so, and I would be more likely
to buy it if it did. So, if it got anything above 35, the seller would
have crowed about it. He didn't, so it doesn't. The salesman
didn't tell me anything about the bumpers. I assume therefore
that they are the minimum required by law. If they were
stronger, he would have said so.
And so it goes. An assume-the-worst position enables the
customer to learn everything important with a minimum of
words. The seller reveals, through speech or silence, every
salient attribute. Every good attribute is revealed by the seller,
and on every bad attribute the seller can be silent and the buyer
assume the worst. There's no need for an extended
conversation.
What makes it possible to get the truth from an interested
presentation, thatis, a statement by a party with an interest in
the outcome of the transaction, and who slants what can be
slanted? The process works only when some strong conditions
are satisfied.2
One is truth, which has two-components. The statement must
be verifiable (the buyer can find out after purchase what
mileage the car gets). And a statement that is not verified must
carry penalties. The warranty behind anything that's spoken
must be enforced, fully.
Second, the listener must know what the interested party's
slant is: in this case, that the person is trying to sell you a car.
Third, the listener must know what information matters. The
sophisticated, skeptical listener had to know that bumpers
matter, that there is a range of strengths and a legal minimum,
and so on. If the listener did not know these things, this process
wouldn't work.
Fourth, the listener needs to know what subjects the speaker
knows about. That is, a sophisticated listener draws an inference
when the auto salesman is silent about something he could tell
you if he wanted. Otherwise, the inference from silence is not a
good one.
Fifth, the listener has to be sophisticated enough to make an
2. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17
RANDJ. ECON. 18 (1986).
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accurate decision if he possesses all the information.
By and large, these criteria are not directly satisfied in the
automobile market, but they can be satisfied by proxy.
Sophisticated buyers and scientists shop and test, and then write
reviews for the auto magazines and Consumer Reports, whose
team swings a "bumper basher" that reveals how much damage
the car receives. Information then can be disseminated cheaply,
because the product is standardized. One 1996 Ford Tempo is
much like another. Moreover, sophisticated shoppers protect
others by influencing the price at which these models sell.
Now what about the legal system? None of the five criteria
holds, and the legal system does not have the same proxies as do
economic markets. Sad to say, lies are told in court without
detection or punishment. Jurors and judges know the party's
slant in a general way (plaintiffs want to receive maximum
awards, for example) but do not know the full agenda, which
may include arrangements out of court and interests in other
cases. They do not know what information each side possesses;
even the parties do not know this, because discovery is not fully
revealing. They do not know what information matters (this is
just a restatement of the proposition that they are amateurs).
They do not draw sophisticated inferences.
Let me come back to the question how society deals with
informational asymmetries (the technical term) in daily life..
Think about the securities market. Very complex and
sophisticated institutions cope with these problems. Underlying
assets can be inspected. There are third-party reviewers, who we
call auditors. There are third-party guarantors, who we call
investment bankers. There are bonds of good faith: for
example, the managers of corporations own stock, and you
believe what they say about the firms to the extent that they're
putting their money where their mouths are. There are payouts
(dividends and repayments of debt) that are very hard for
people who are trying to fake you to duplicate, because they
don't have the money to pay out regularly. There are markets
for stock, where professionals set the price and get the benefit of
trading at the price the professionals deem right. And there are,
of course, legal guarantees. Penalties for fraud in the securities
business are quite high.
The judicial system does not use any of those devices, not a
one of them. Penalties for perjury, and ethical discipline of
[Vol. 20
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lawyers, come closest, but there is, alas, a weak relation between
false testimony in a courtroom and prosecution for perjury. The
idea of the adversarial system is that, in lieu of these
complicated institutions and sophisticated users of information
(as inquisitorial judges are supposed to be), we put another
sophisticated speaker in the room.'
When the prosecutor is done talking, the defense lawyer gets
up. After the prosecutor has said certain things about the
evidence, the defense lawyer says, "You know, he hasn't told you
about the bumpers yet, has he? They're flimsy." But how well
does a two-sided presentation substitute for a sophisticated user
of information? Poorly, I fear. Let us go through the five
conditions once again.
1) Even with two speakers in the room, we need a rule against
fraud, for now either side may be trying to mislead. One lawyer
may have told it straight, and the other may introduce bogus
evidence. As I say, we don't have strong enforcement of the rule
against fraud, because to enforce that rule we must be able to
prove the truth beyond a reasonable doubt. But unlike a
physical item, which can be inspected or tested, the propositions
advanced in litigation usually do not have simple true-false
properties. What did Smith see on the evening of January 23?
What did Green say to Jones? What is the best definition of an
economic market? How many false positives were there when
testing suspects for drugs? We use the legal system to work out
the answers to these questions, and we do not have a solid
method external to the system to verify the answers and enforce
penalties for deceit.
2) Neither side is fully informed about what the other knows,
and therefore neither adversary knows what is essential to
highlight shortcomings on the other's presentation. Unless it is
possible to distinguish information withheld (and from which
an adverse inference should be drawn) from information
unknown, the method of sophisticated skepticism won't get us
to astute inferences.
3) The process of inference-drawing works only when all
3. See Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobyashi, Naive, Biased, yet Bayesian: Can Juries
Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence2, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 257 (1996). Froeb and
Kobyashi give a qualified "yes" to the question in their title for reasons similar to those
explored in Mllgrom & Roberts, see supra note 2. My answer in the text is "no" because I
do not think the essential conditions of that approach are satisfied.
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inferences are allowable. What made the auto exchange so
informative was that the sophisticated buyer could say: "He
didn't say a thing about the bumpers, so I assume that they are
weak." The parallel is that the trier of fact must be allowed to
draw adverse inferences from silence, yet we have legal rules
that constrain that. A prosecutor is not allowed to argue to the
jury that the defendant didn't testify, and that inferences
therefore should be drawn, even if this process of reasoning is
sound.4 Many inferences are forbidden or discouraged for
substantive reasons.
4) Only when the topic of the exchange is precisely defined
will the inferential process work. It's clear in the auto
transaction exactly what's going on. Somebody is trying to buy
the best auto for the lowest price, and the seller is trying to get
the maximum price he can for the auto he has to sell. There is
no similar constraint in trials, a subject covered in the previous
Panel. Extraneous matter often is introduced into the trials by
such things as send-them-a-message arguments. The prosecutor
asks the jurors to "send a message" that drugs can't be tolerated,
or the defense asks the jurors to "send a message" that police
brutality is unacceptable, or the plaintiff that deep-pocket
corporations can't make unsafe products. Send-them-a-message
arguments often are extraneous to the issue and, therefore,
violate the conditions that make an inferential process work.
5) Given that decisionmakers are amateurs, lawyers play to
their audience. Many find that it does not pay to learn the
technical details of a subject, because the information will not
prove useful. So we see the spectacle of lawyers making
arguments pro and con about the etiology of a disease by citing
only judicial opinions," or contending that scientific disputes
can be resolved by cross-examination rather than by scientific
method.6
Once more, consider how we deal with difficulties outside the
courtroom, because I have been talking about ordinary
weaknesses of the human existence. We aren't calculating
machines. We deal with these problems regularly outside the
courtroom, but largely through the medium of markets. People
4. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
5. See Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Hilliard, 65 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1995).
6. See United States v. Pierre, 47 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 1995).
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make their own choices, and if they choose wrongly, they pay for
their errors. If they buy a bad car the first time, they are
penalized for it. They learn from their mistakes. Those who do
not learn still can buy at prices that to a substantial degree
reflect the strengths and weaknesses of a product, because
informed buyers influence prices strongly.7
We deal with these problems by training and education, so
that people don't have to learn from their own errors but can
learn from other people's errors. We deal with them by
expertise. Some people have trained longer and harder in this
field than others; their information is passed on in books and
magazines and newspapers. Finally, we deal with them by
selection. If we have to have someone else make choices for us,
we choose those who, by reason of their training or experience
or background or learning, are least likely to commit errors.
Yet in the adversarial trial, we disdain all of these devices.
Jurors are one-shot deciders, screened for ignorance rather than
expertise, and they don't pay for their errors either directly or
indirectly. To convict the innocent or acquit the guilty has very
large costs for the people involved but very low costs for the
jurors, because although either convicting the innocent or
acquitting the guilty slightly reduces deterrence, the amount at
the margin in one trial is so small as to be outside the jurors'
sphere of concern. That makes it a lot easier in these cases to
persuade amateur deciders to follow the send-them-a-message
line. This is your 15 minutes of fame. Take a stand. If you don't
send a message, at least produce more fairness, an ex post
equality of distribution, even though the legal system needs to
be greatly concerned with ex ante incentives.8
From all of this, it should be clear that wagging fingers at the
lawyers is not productive. They take the system as given,
advancing their clients' interests as best they can given these
limitations. I did not come here, however, just to pronounce
doom and despair. Most disputes are resolved out of court,
between professionals, and I think that these settlements and
7. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Competitive
Equilibria in Markets for Heterogeneous Goods Under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical
Analysis with Policy Implications, 13 BELLJ. EcON. 181 (1982).
8. See Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
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plea bargains are reliable in the main. They reflect the
probabilities of what a court will do, for legal decisions (even
those influenced by amateurs) are more reliable in the
aggregate than in any individual case; settlement reflects the
median outcome of litigation rather than the tails of the
distribution.9 Changes to make the anticipated outcome more
accurate are nonetheless both possible and desirable, even if
committing more decisions to professionals (not judges per se,
but judicial experts, of the kind specialized tribunals elsewhere
in the world use) is not a likely development in the United
States.
1. If we cannot commit decisions to professional adjudicators,
we can at least increase the level of sophistication in the jury.
For example, we can follow the approach of other countries-
the United Kingdom, for example-and allow or encourage
jurors to be repeat players, to hear many trials and notjust one.
Members of the grand jury sit for months at a time. Petit jurors
also can develop greater sophistication by spending more time
in the courtroom. When scientific evidence is to be used, we can
screen the jury for knowledge rather than screening for
ignorance, as seems to be today's norm. The "blue ribbon jury"
should be common. Parties have a right to unbiased jurors, not
to ignorant or stupid ones. Mixed lay-and-professional
factfinding bodies could be employed, as they are in some other
nations."0
2. We can impose steeper penalties for fraud. Penalties can be
direct or indirect. The major risk for a lawyer who tries to
mislead a tribunal in most of the world is not that a damages
award will be entered or that he'll lose his license but that the
judge will lift his eyebrow. Such a response is very serious,
because with a smaller bar before a smaller bench, all the
lawyers are repeat players, and losing credibility has very large
cost." Although the United States has both a large bar and a
large bench in the major cities, which diminishes reputational
penalties, the effective size of both bench and bar can be
9. I expand on this point in Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE LJ. 1969 (1992);
Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19; and Criminal Procedure
as a Market System, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Court, 1 J.
LEG. STUD. 135 (1972).
11. Se generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery asAbuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989).
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diminished through specialization. Bankruptcy courts handle
the business with greater dispatch (and apparently less deceit)
because both bench and bar are specialized; this is true in tax
and patent cases as well.
3. A third option is to allow more freedom to use probative
evidence and draw sound inferences. A start has been made on
excluding 'Junk science" from the courtroom,2 but curtailing
access to misleading information is inferior to improving the
ability of the legal system to draw good inferences from the
whole body of evidence. This is not the place to develop an
argument on the question whether the exclusionary rule should
be relaxed, or whether a prosecutor should be allowed to
comment on a defendant's decision not to testify. For the
present, my only point is that adjudication in an adversarial
system will be more accurate, the more logical inferences are
permitted.
As more of society's disputes are drawn into the adversary
process, it is vital to understand the limits of adjudication, and
to explore simple steps that can be taken to make adjudication
more accurate. By exploring the logical limitations of the
existing inferential process we can see which options hold the
most potential for constructive change.
12. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gacy v.
Welborn, 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993).
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